W e present n m o d of coordinated intelIiKout agcrit intelligent control hnsd lipon epistemic utility tlic!ory. Thin moclel providcs each agent with m cpintrruic nyntem, which nccoiixib for its goale and vdiios, its tdiefs, its willixigxicss to risk error, the cxintciicc! of iiicoxnplete antl contradictory evidence, ~x i d tlic ptmsihility that currently held beliefs are untriio. Tlic? xnotlcl is sitfflcicxitly broad to address rcnl insiicw wliilo providing sufflcicnt cletail nnd mnthemnticd prcxinioii to be practicnlly iisefiil for the problems of c!atixnatiou nnd control. The model is illustrated with a millti-agent robot sirnillatian.
INTRODUCTION
Intelligent control reqiiircs agents to act au-I.oiiotnoiisly, and to do so in a manner that permits each i i i w i i h r of a multiple agent group to coordinate its be1i;ivior with other agcnts in its environment. Multiple :iqiiit. coortliriation has many faccts, ranging from idcali xc.cl si t u ;it, ions w I iere i nstari tancous corn m ii n i cation bet.wc:trii agori1.s is pokqiblc antl all agents are committed 1.0 coiiipldc cooperation, to situations involving limited n )i I I I i iii t i ic;ition aiitl possil)ly con fl icti tig goals. In any iiiiiltipl~: agciit scenario, it is possible that some agents iti;iy wish to cooperate, some may wish to operate indep.iiclc:iit.ly, ii11Cl otliers riiay wish to act in opposition.
III tliv piirsiiit of rca.sonai)lc a p p r o a c h to rniilti agent ~oor(liii;iI.ioii, we have bccii Icd to it revicw of .some of tliv Imsic prt:iriiscs of decision theory. 'l'lic proccss and iiic*t.lioclology of Iiiiiriiin clecision making and, particularly, sciwtific iiiqiiiry, has long been a topic of cliscustion and clc4);itc: ;iiiioiig pliilosophcrs. For thrcc clccadcs, Isaac I , w i 11;~s activcly atltlrcsscd thc problcin of how scientific kiiowlc:tlgc: is ancl slioiilcl be acquired. Ilc has developed ;in cl)isl.(,iiiological iiiodcl of the behavior of a single rat i o i i ; i l ;ig~iit. in thc acqiiisitioii of new truth [ l , 2, 31. His epidemic utilify fheory addresses the broad problem of knowledge acquisition, including the goals and values of a rational agent, the agent's willingness to risk error, incomplete and contradictory evidence, the possibility that currently held beliefs are untrue, and experiment design and statistical inference. Levi's work is sufficiently broad to address real issues while providing sufficient detail and mathematical precision to be practically useful for the problems of estimation and control [4]. It parallels much of statistical decision theory in that it is based upon expected utility, but differs from conventional approaches in the definition of the utility function and in the structure of the decision rules that emerge.
Coordination is a neutral concept. Cooperation, negotiation, competition, and any other form of behavior short of complete indifference and isolation between agents will involve some form of coordination. Consequently, we employ a very broad definition: Auy decision by an agent that uses informafion concerning the existence, decisions, or decision-making strategies of any other agents is a coordinated decision. Information used for coordination may be either known U priori (for example, a prediction model), it may be communicated between agents directly, it may be obtained viasensory input, or it may be learnctl by the agent as it functions in its environment.
Much of the recent literature on coordination deals primarily with the issue of controlling the flow of information between agents for the purpose of enhancing their decision-making capabilities. For example, comrnunication protocols are required with hierarchal based systems [5, 6, 71. Communication analysis is also required with distributed artificial intelligence problems, such as negotiation processes [SI 9, lo], and for distributed reasoning [ l l , 12, 13, 14, 15, 161. Research is also providing a growing body of literature on related issues such as data fusion, sensor distribution, communication bandwidth tradeoffs, reliability enhancement, system complex-0-7803-0720-8/92 $3.00 01992 IEEE
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~ ity, and data management. Much of the research in coordination theory, however, assumes a particular type of coordination, namely, cooperation, where all agents are united and the goal is to design an architecture that permits some acceptable joint outcome to be achieved.
In addition to the very important issues of inter-agent communication, however, it appears that much remains to be accomplished in the development of formalisms for coordination. Communication is only one of the key issues of a theory of coordination. Consider, for example, the producer-consumer-transporter (PCT) problem domain, introduced by Durfee [7] . This domain consists of a number of agents tasked with transporting objects from producers to consumers. Coordination between the agents is used to control the flow of objects. Durfee takes a nonreactive approach to this problem, and requires explicit communication of control behavior between agents prior to their activation.
We also use the PCT problem as a test domain for our theory, but we focus in this paper on reactive coordination, rather than explicit communication. We permit the agents to respond to real-time sensor and communications information to adjust their behavior during their operation. Two critical features of reactive coordination are the notions of linking and learning. Two (or more) agents are linked together if at least one of them possesses sufficient information regarding what the other agent is likely to do to enable itself to adjust its own strategy to improve its performance. Learning takes place if an agent is able to modify, through experience, its linkage such that it can improve its performance even more. In this paper we provide a mechanism for linkage, and demonstrate how learning may be incorporated into this linkage.
EPISTEMIC SYSTEMS
Since a detailed discussion of epistemic utility theory is contained in [4], we provide only a brief summary here. An agent is any entity that is endowed with a body of knowledge, is capable of making decisions, and possesses goals and belief regarding its possible decisions. We refer to this collection of knowledge, possible decisions, goals, and beliefs as an epistemic system [4]. Formally, let X be a n agent with epistemic system { K t , U t , Gt, a,} at time t.
K t is X ' s knowIedge corpus, containing all logical truths, all set-theoretical truths, and all mathematical truths that are expressible in X's language at time t , and is deductively closed.
U, is X's ultimate partition, or set of hypotheses, consisting of all seriously possible actions available at time 2 . We assume the cardinality of Ut is finite. Let nt denote the number of elements in U t , and let
Gt is
Bt is 3; denote the Boolean algebra of elements of Ut; Ft contains 2"' elements. Each element of Ft is a potential answer for X .
X's system of informational valuation, that reflects the informational worth or value of any action to X ;
This system consists of a collection of utility functions, each element of which is an equivalence class (that is, equivalent up to positive linear transformations) of utilities.
X's a system of truth valuation, that reflects X's subjective assessment of belief in each action being correct. This system consists of a convez set of probability functions, each member of which is a serious possibility for being a valid characterization of X's beliefs.
X may represent the informational value of potential answers by assigning to elements of Ut nonnegative real values such that their sum is unity. The informational value of a potential answer is the sum of the values assigned each element of Ut that is rejected according to the potential answer; that is, if we enumerate Vt = { h l t , h 2 t , . . ., hntt), and let mi : 3t I-+ [O, 1 1 denote the value X assigns to h E Ut, then CyAlmt(hjt) = 1.
For any set g c Ut, we define
is, of adding U h j r C g hjt to nt.
The function m i ( . ) thus defined is a probability measure over 3t. Levi terms this probability an informafiondefermining probability. It is intended to regulate the evaluation of information regardless of its truth-value-it is a measure of the demand for information. Thus, if X considers rejecting g , it is certain that it will obtain informational value worth mt(g). It does not know whether g is true or false. The utility of accepting g in the interest of acquiring new information regardless of its truth-value is, then, c t ( g ) = 1 -mt(g). We may view m t ( . ) as a reflecting the goals and values of X at time t .
Independently from establishing a utility to characterize the informational value of accepting or rejecting a given action, the agent must also establish a measure of belief for all actions that are available. We shall use probability for this measure. Credal probability is probability formed on the basis of subjective judgment, represents the likelihood that a hypothesis is true, and is independent of any informational value or demand that might be associated with the hypothesis. Through this paper we shall treat the terms credal and belief as synonyms.
For a given ultimate partition U t , let qt : 3; H [0,1] be a probability measure such that q t ( g ) denote X's credal probability assignment to any element g E Ft. If g bears positive credal probability, then X evaluates the truth of g as a serious possibility. X may adopt any hypothesis in 3:, the Boolean algebra generated by the elements of the ultimate partition, Ut. This structure expands X's hypotheses beyond the possibilities available with conventional decision theory; it is not constrained to select only the elementary events, hit E U t , but may choose any subset of them. The decision rule for this problem is to reject any hypothesis for which the informational value of rejection exceeds the belief that it is correct. The threshold for this rejection is If more than one action survives this test, expected utility has failed to decide between them, and we must go beyond considerations of expected utility to resolve the question. Ties may be broken by appealing to the maximin principle, and choosing a hypothesis that maximizes the minimum utility of all unrejected hypotheses. This approach is quite different from regular maximin rules where the maximization and minimization operations take place over the entire ultimate partition of feasible hypotheses. Here, the operation takes place only over those hypotheses that have survived the tests based upon expected utility.
COORDINATED INTELLIGENT CONTROL
Suppose each of N agents, X i , i = ~,...,XN, is endowed with its own epistemic system quadruple, In the absence of coordination, each agent would act unilaterally in accordance with its own epistemic system. But if agent Xi can gain information concerning any or all elements of Xi's epistemic quadruple, j # i, it may modify its epistemic system in at least one of two ways: (a) update its qi function (that is, change its beliefs), and (b) modify its mi function (that is, change its goals) to account for the epistemic systems of its cognate agents.
In the interest of simplicity, let us consider only two agents, X1 and X2, with their corresponding epistemic systems represented by { X i t , U i t , Q i t , B i t } , i = 1,2.
Further, let us suppose that Xi's truth valuation system consists of the convex set composed of all convex combinations' of two probability mass functions p i , and P:,, namely, 
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
To illustrate the function of epistemic systems and to demonstrate the notion of coordination, we develop the reactive PCT example. is tasked to produce the corresponding object, but it is not yet ready (it either has not been manufactured or has not been delivered). The circles indicate the transporters. These are the intelligent agents in this problem, and it is these entities that must be endowed with epistemic systems. The two agents with inscribed triangles ( X O and X,) represent one team, while the two agents containing small squares (XI and X3) represent a second team. The players are emplaced according to some initial conditions, and the game flows in discrete time. At each move time each agent must decide what control action it will make, and the agents all make their moves simultaneously. All agents make their decisions by using their epistemic systems according to Levi's rule of epistemic utility. Ties are broken according to the maximin principal applied to the unrejected hypotheses. 
A . Players' Epidemic Sysiems
The knowledge corpus for a transporter consists of the following: it knows the locations of all agents (including itself) and of the PC's. (In a more realistic scenario, this information would be obtained via noisy sensory data; we assume an idealized situation, corresponding to perfect sensors.) It knows enough mathematics to calculate distances, and it knows that it cannot collide with another transporter, and cannot pass through walls. Each transporter's ultimate partition consists of its set of legal moves. We will endow each transporter with the ability to move like a chess king: one square in any of the eight board directions (unless a move coincides with the flag), or to remain where it is. To enable the transporters to work their way around walls, we provide them with a memory of their previous N moves, and prohibit them from moving to any of the past N locations. Each transporter's move strategy is governed by its systems of informational and credal valuation. Each transporter has three modes of action: it may move to a PC to pick up an object, it may move to a PC to deliver an object, or it may sit in an idle mode while it waits for an assignment. The transporter assumes a uniform distribution for the informational value determining probability, since, independent of its beliefs, no move has more informational value than any other. To compute its credal probability, however, each agent computes, for each legal move, the Euclidean distance to the PC it is seeking. It then subtracts this distance from the maximum over all such distances, and normalizes these quantities to unity. Thus, if we let 3 denote the position of PCi, the target PC, in Cartesian coordinates, and let {&,} denote the set of possible moves for Transporter X, , then the credal probability for X, is m-{PiL}
The resulting function is a probability measure defined over the ultimate partition, and assigns higher credal probability to moves toward PCi than to moves away from it. We finish the specification of the epistemic system by setting the index of boldness, b j , to unity for each agent, thus ensuring a maximally bold strategy (in the sense that the decision rule will eliminate as many hypotheses as possible).
B. Ideal Reactive Behavior
Each agent is controlled by its own epistemic system; all agents are completely autonomous. They make their decisions based upon the local conditions of the environment, and do not attempt to anticipate future behavior for themselves or for other agents. In this sense, the agents appear to be endowed with little more than "instinctual" capabilities. In fact, none of the agents is endowed with specific abilities other than what is implied through their individual epistemic systems. Clearly, much more sophisticated memory and prediction capabilities could be built into the epistemic system to make them more intelligent, but we are attempting to make this game as simple as possible without being trivial.
In an ideal situation, each agent would communicate with the other agents, and would therefore know the precise assignments of its teammate agent. To be specific, suppose Transporter Xo is assigned to pick up triangles at PCo, and that X z is assigned to deliver triangles to PC4. for ai E [0,1] ; i = 1,2, where qxilxifpc, denotes the conditional probability mass function of Xi given that it is assigned to deliver objects to P C j , and qxilxi/pcj denotes the conditional probability mass function of Xi given that it is assigned to pick up objects at P C j . Ideal coordination between X O and X2 occurs if both agents agree on their strategies; for example, if X O and X2 agree to use PC2 as their relay point. This situation would correspond to Xo selecting QO = 1 and communicating this information to X2, resulting in X2 setting a2 = 1. A similar arrangement must be made between Transporters X1 and X3 relative to the origin, P e l , the destination, PC5, and the relay point, either PC2 or PC3. If X I and Xz are able to communicate with each other and with X O and X2, then ideal coordination will be completed if XI and X3 agree to use PC3 as their relay point.
C. Learned Reactive Behavior
Suppose that explicit communication between agents as defined above is not possible, and that, consequently, X O is not able to communicate its value of a0 to X2, who, therefore, is not able to narrow its choices for az. Without additional information, X2 would be unable to resolve this conflict, and would likely not be successful in its mission to transport objects to its assigned destination. We now suppose, however, that X2 is able to observe the behavior of X O , and construct a real-time estimate of a0 according to the following estimation rule: where 1 if Xo moves toward PC2 0 if X O moves away from PC2 Nt = { is a discrete-time point process that monitors the motion of XO relative to PC2 and PC3. Thus, X2 may observe the motion of X O and infer the likelihood that X O is delivering to PC2 or PC3. Once the object has been delivered (say, at time t d ) , however, the learning phase is over, and XZ must commit to one of the options, even though the iteration Riven above mav not have convereed to either &O = 1 or t i 0 = 0. Thus, a final decision must be made before X2's learning is complete. This decision can also be made according to Levi's rule of epistemic utility by choosing the decision according to a likelihood ratio test consisting or the ratio of the credal and informational value probabilities associated with the decision to have X2 choose between PC2 and PC3. We will use a O ( t d ) as the credal probability for this test and, under the assumption that X2 has no valuational preferences for PC2 over PC3, will assign uniform informational value to these two hypotheses. Thus, X2 will make its final assignment 
V. CONCLUSION
Epistemic utility theory provides a mathematical framework in which to embed the decision-making strategies of intelligent agents. Some of the features of this approach include:
a No explicit hierarchy is required. It is not necessary to specify relative authority, priority, or any other type of ranking between the agents. If a natural hierarchy happens to exist, it may be embedded into the joint epistemic system via the joint informational or belief valuations.
'
The agents may be heterogeneous. They do not need to share the same decision space, the same capabilities, or the same knowledge. There is no requirement that they possess similar communication capabilities, similar sensory capabilities, or similar desires for coordination.
The agents may be cooperative, adversative, or indifferent. Scenarios simultaneously involving cooperative agents, competitive agents, and coalitions of both types of agents may be characterized via the joint epistemic system, Explicit communication between agents is not required for coordination to occur. Although some form of information sharing between agents is necessary for coordination, this sharing may take several forms: direct communication, prediction modeling, sensory observations, and learning. All of 'The author will be happy to provide a Windows 3.0 executable these forms of information sharing can be modeled through the epistemic system structure.
e A facility for learned coordination may be implemented within the framework provided by epistemic systems. The learning occurs when an agent is able to observe the behavior of other agents and thereby estimate some or all of the probabilities that make up its epistemic system.
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